Modes Of Introduction
Implementation : REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
Applicable Platforms
Language
Name: PHP (Undetermined)
Common Consequences
Scope |
Impact |
Likelihood |
Integrity | Modify Application Data | |
Observed Examples
References |
Description |
| File upload allows arbitrary file read by setting hidden form variables to match internal variable names. |
| Mistakenly trusts $PHP_SELF variable to determine if include script was called by its parent. |
| PHP remote file inclusion by modified assumed-immutable variable. |
| Modify key variable when calling scripts that don't load a library that initializes it. |
| Authentication bypass by modifying array used for authentication. |
Potential Mitigations
Phases : Requirements // Implementation
Carefully identify which variables can be controlled or influenced by an external user, and consider adopting a naming convention to emphasize when externally modifiable variables are being used. An application should be reluctant to trust variables that have been initialized outside of its trust boundary. Ensure adequate checking is performed when relying on input from outside a trust boundary. Do not allow your application to run with register_globals enabled. If you implement a register_globals emulator, be extremely careful of variable extraction, dynamic evaluation, and similar issues, since weaknesses in your emulation could allow external variable modification to take place even without register_globals.
Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Justification : This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comment : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Related Attack Patterns
CAPEC-ID |
Attack Pattern Name |
CAPEC-77 |
Manipulating User-Controlled Variables This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, and So Forth). An adversary can override variables leveraging user-supplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the application server without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the adversary can change variables controlling the business logic of the application. For instance, in languages like PHP, a number of poorly set default configurations may allow the user to override variables. |
NotesNotes
This is a language-specific instance of Modification of Assumed-Immutable Data (MAID). This can be resultant from direct request (alternate path) issues. It can be primary to weaknesses such as PHP file inclusion, SQL injection, XSS, authentication bypass, and others.
Submission
Name |
Organization |
Date |
Date release |
Version |
PLOVER |
|
2006-07-19 +00:00 |
2006-07-19 +00:00 |
Draft 3 |
Modifications
Name |
Organization |
Date |
Comment |
Eric Dalci |
Cigital |
2008-07-01 +00:00 |
updated Time_of_Introduction |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2008-09-08 +00:00 |
updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-12-28 +00:00 |
updated Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2010-02-16 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-06-01 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2012-05-11 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2012-10-30 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2014-07-30 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2017-11-08 +00:00 |
updated Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-02-24 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |