The product does not properly compartmentalize or isolate functionality, processes, or resources that require different privilege levels, rights, or permissions.

When a weakness occurs in functionality that is accessible by lower-privileged users, then without strong boundaries, an attack might extend the scope of the damage to higher-privileged users.

Modes Of Introduction

Architecture and Design : COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic.
Implementation

Applicable Platforms

Language

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

Common Consequences

Observed Examples

Potential Mitigations

Phases : Architecture and Design
Break up privileges between different modules, objects, or entities. Minimize the interfaces between modules and require strong access control between them.

Detection Methods

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Effectiveness : SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Effectiveness : High

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Effectiveness : High

Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Rationale : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comments : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Notes

There is a close association with CWE-250 (Execution with Unnecessary Privileges). CWE-653 is about providing separate components for each "privilege"; CWE-250 is about ensuring that each component has the least amount of privileges possible. In this fashion, compartmentalization becomes one mechanism for reducing privileges.
The term "Separation of Privilege" is used in several different ways in the industry, but they generally combine two closely related principles: compartmentalization (this node) and using only one factor in a security decision (CWE-654). Proper compartmentalization implicitly introduces multiple factors into a security decision, but there can be cases in which multiple factors are required for authentication or other mechanisms that do not involve compartmentalization, such as performing all required checks on a submitted certificate. It is likely that CWE-653 and CWE-654 will provoke further discussion.

References

REF-196

The Protection of Information in Computer Systems
Jerome H. Saltzer, Michael D. Schroeder.
http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/protection/

REF-535

Separation of Privilege
Sean Barnum, Michael Gegick.
https://web.archive.org/web/20220126060047/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/separation-of-privilege

REF-1138

CVE-2019-6260: Gaining control of BMC from the host processor
Stewart Smith.
https://www.flamingspork.com/blog/2019/01/23/cve-2019-6260:-gaining-control-of-bmc-from-the-host-processor/

Submission

Modifications