The product uses a protection mechanism whose strength depends heavily on its obscurity, such that knowledge of its algorithms or key data is sufficient to defeat the mechanism.

This reliance on "security through obscurity" can produce resultant weaknesses if an attacker is able to reverse engineer the inner workings of the mechanism. Note that obscurity can be one small part of defense in depth, since it can create more work for an attacker; however, it is a significant risk if used as the primary means of protection.

Modes Of Introduction

Architecture and Design
Implementation : REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.

Applicable Platforms

Language

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

Common Consequences

Observed Examples

Potential Mitigations

Phases : Architecture and Design
Always consider whether knowledge of your code or design is sufficient to break it. Reverse engineering is a highly successful discipline, and financially feasible for motivated adversaries. Black-box techniques are established for binary analysis of executables that use obfuscation, runtime analysis of proprietary protocols, inferring file formats, and others.
Phases : Architecture and Design
When available, use publicly-vetted algorithms and procedures, as these are more likely to undergo more extensive security analysis and testing. This is especially the case with encryption and authentication.

Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Rationale : This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate
Comments : Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit

Notes

Note that there is a close relationship between this weakness and CWE-603 (Use of Client-Side Authentication). If developers do not believe that a user can reverse engineer a client, then they are more likely to choose client-side authentication in the belief that it is safe.

References

REF-196

The Protection of Information in Computer Systems
Jerome H. Saltzer, Michael D. Schroeder.
http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/protection/

REF-544

Never Assuming that Your Secrets Are Safe
Sean Barnum, Michael Gegick.
https://web.archive.org/web/20220126060054/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/never-assuming-that-your-secrets-are-safe

REF-542

RFC: 793, TRANSMISSION CONTROL PROTOCOL
Jon Postel, Editor.
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc0793.txt

Submission

Modifications