CWE-923
Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints
Incomplete
2013-07-17 00:00 +00:00
2024-02-29 00:00 +00:00
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Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints
The product establishes a communication channel to (or from) an endpoint for privileged or protected operations, but it does not properly ensure that it is communicating with the correct endpoint.
Extended Description
Attackers might be able to spoof the intended endpoint from a different system or process, thus gaining the same level of access as the intended endpoint.
While this issue frequently involves authentication between network-based clients and servers, other types of communication channels and endpoints can have this weakness.
Informations
Modes Of Introduction
Architecture and Design : REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.Applicable Platforms
Language
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)Common Consequences
| Scope | Impact | Likelihood |
|---|---|---|
| Integrity Confidentiality | Gain Privileges or Assume Identity Note: If an attacker can spoof the endpoint, the attacker gains all the privileges that were intended for the original endpoint. |
Observed Examples
| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
| S-bus functionality in a home automation product performs access control using an IP allowlist, which can be bypassed by a forged IP address. | |
| A troubleshooting tool exposes a web server on a random port between 9000-65535 that could be used for information gathering | |
| A WAN interface on a router has firewall restrictions enabled for IPv4, but it does not for IPv6, which is enabled by default | |
| Product has a Silverlight cross-domain policy that does not restrict access to another application, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy. | |
| Mobile banking application does not verify hostname, leading to financial loss. | |
| chain: incorrect "goto" in Apple SSL product bypasses certificate validation, allowing Adversry-in-the-Middle (AITM) attack (Apple "goto fail" bug). CWE-705 (Incorrect Control Flow Scoping) -> CWE-561 (Dead Code) -> CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation) -> CWE-393 (Return of Wrong Status Code) -> CWE-300 (Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint). | |
| DNS server can accept DNS updates from hosts that it did not query, leading to cache poisoning |
Detection Methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)Effectiveness : High
Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Rationale : This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriateComments : Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
Related Attack Patterns
| CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-161 | Infrastructure Manipulation An attacker exploits characteristics of the infrastructure of a network entity in order to perpetrate attacks or information gathering on network objects or effect a change in the ordinary information flow between network objects. Most often, this involves manipulation of the routing of network messages so, instead of arriving at their proper destination, they are directed towards an entity of the attackers' choosing, usually a server controlled by the attacker. The victim is often unaware that their messages are not being processed correctly. For example, a targeted client may believe they are connecting to their own bank but, in fact, be connecting to a Pharming site controlled by the attacker which then collects the user's login information in order to hijack the actual bank account. |
| CAPEC-481 | Contradictory Destinations in Traffic Routing Schemes Adversaries can provide contradictory destinations when sending messages. Traffic is routed in networks using the domain names in various headers available at different levels of the OSI model. In a Content Delivery Network (CDN) multiple domains might be available, and if there are contradictory domain names provided it is possible to route traffic to an inappropriate destination. The technique, called Domain Fronting, involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. An alternative technique, called Domainless Fronting, is similar, but the SNI field is left blank. |
| CAPEC-501 | Android Activity Hijack An adversary intercepts an implicit intent sent to launch a Android-based trusted activity and instead launches a counterfeit activity in its place. The malicious activity is then used to mimic the trusted activity's user interface and prompt the target to enter sensitive data as if they were interacting with the trusted activity. |
| CAPEC-697 | DHCP Spoofing An adversary masquerades as a legitimate Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) server by spoofing DHCP traffic, with the goal of redirecting network traffic or denying service to DHCP. |
Submission
| Name | Organization | Date | Date Release | Version |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | 2.5 |
Modifications
| Name | Organization | Date | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Description, Name, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Maintenance_Notes | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Description, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Detection_Factors, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Mapping_Notes | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Observed_Examples | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples |
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